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ARGUMENT 
To simplify this Court's review of the arguments contained in this Reply, 
Defendant asks the Court to use the definitions for items set forth below which are 
comparable to the definitions as employed in the Defendant's Brief of the Appellant. 
"Betty" is the decedent Betty A. Banks. 
The "Trust" is a trust entitled the "Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust" 
created by Betty on or about April 15, 1992, by execution of a document entitled "The 
Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust" which was dated April 15, 1992. {Brief of 
the Appellant, p.6). 
The "1992 Trust" is the document entitled "The Betty A. Banks Family 
Protection Trust" and executed by Betty on April 15, 1992 which established the Trust. 
("1992 Trust") (R.156 and 211) {Brief of the Appellant, Exhibit 1). 
The "Handwritten Note" is a note written by Mr. Piatt and executed on or about 
August 7, 1999 by Betty, which indicated that Defendant was to be the beneficiary of 
the Trust with the Plaintiffs as alternate beneficiaries, and that Defendant was to be the 
successor trustee, executor of will and agent under P.O. A. with the Plaintiffs as back 
up. (R.601, 519, 496 and 498) {Brief of the Appellant, Exhibit 2). 
The "1999 Amendment" is a document entitled "The Betty A. Banks Family 
Protection Trust as amended August 9, 1999" executed by Betty on or about August 9, 
1999. (R.227 and 157) {Brief of the Appellant, Exhibit 3). 
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The "Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment" is two (2) pages contained in the 
1999 Amendment which both contain the phrase "Amended August 9, 1999" and the 
initials of Betty. (R.229 and 235). 
A. The Handwritten Note, the 1999 Amendment and the Two (2) Pages of 
the 1999 Amendment complied with the requirements of Section 3.1 of 
the 1992 Trust to effect a modification resulting in the grant of a 
superior beneficial interest to the Defendant. 
The Plaintiffs in their Reply [sic] Brief of Appellees cite the Court to In re 
Estate of Tosh, 920 P.2d 1230 (Wash. App. 1996) for the proposition that under Mr. 
Piatt's version of the facts, the two (2) pages of the 1999 Amendment could not effect a 
modification of the 1992 Trust by their insertion into the 1992 Trust. (Reply [sic] Brief 
of Appellees, p.35) While Tosh is not controlling law for this Court, it is still 
instructive as to the methodology to be employed to modify a trust document, mainly 
that any modification of a trust must comply with the procedural requirements set forth 
in the trust instrument. However, the Plaintiffs reliance upon Tosh to support their 
position is misplaced, as a correct application of Tosh to the case at bar leads to a result 
favorable to the Defendant. 
In Tosh, the Court found that the trustor's mere substitution of the pages in the 
document without any authentication was not in compliance with the procedural 
requirements set forth in the trust agreement as the trust agreement specifically 
mandated that an amendment be a "duly executed instrument." Id. at 1232. The Court 
stated: 
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"The trust provided that it could be amended by the trustor "by a duly 
executed instrument filed with Trustee". The parties dispute whether 
"executed" means signed. Taking this word out of context, the definitions of 
"executed" may differ. But however "executed" is defined, we are satisfied 
that merely substituting a page of a trust agreement is not a "duly executed 
instrument". A more formal procedure is required. The substituted page was 
not initialed, signed, or witnessed in writing. The date at the bottom of the 
substituted page remained unchanged. No addendum or attachment was 
added to the trust instrument. Indeed, nothing on the face of the document 
indicated that it had been amended." 
Id. 
In order to conform with Tosh and to modify the 1992 Trust, Betty must have 
complied with the procedural requirements of the 1992 Trust to effect a modification. 
Section 3.1 of the 1992 Trust controls the method of modification (including a 
revocation in part if this Court adopts the view that a revocation is required to effect a 
modification resulting in the grant of a superior beneficial interest to the Defendant). 
The only procedural requirement set forth by Section 3.1 of the 1992 Trust is that the 
modification must be in writing and delivered to the trustee. 
The three (3) documents described by the Defendant in Brief of the Appellant, 1) 
the Handwritten Note, 2) the entire 1999 Amendment, or 3) Two (2) Pages of the 1999 
Amendment, ("Modifying Documents") all complied with the requirements of Section 
3.1 of the 1992 Trust as each was in writing and delivered to Betty, the then acting 
trustee at the time of execution. In fact, each Modifying Document exceeded the 
requirements of Section 3.1 of the 1992 Trust by containing either execution by 
signature and/or initial of Betty and a date. The standard set forth in Tosh was met as 
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each of the Modifying Documents conformed to the procedural requirements of the 
1992 Trust. 
The effect of the modification by all three (3) of the Modifying Documents on the 
Trust was that: 1) the Defendant was to be granted a contingent beneficial interest in 
the Trust, such that if she survived Betty, the Defendant would be entitled to a 
distribution of the entire corpus and income of the Trust; 2) that the Defendant was to 
be the successor to Betty as trustee of the Trust; and 3) that the Plaintiffs' contingent 
beneficial interest would be divested, such that they would only be entitled to a 
distribution from the Trust if the Defendant did not survive Betty. 
B. The Handwritten Note, the 1999 Amendment and the Two (2) Pages of 
the 1999 Amendment were each executed and/or initialed by Betty. 
Throughout their Reply [sic] Brief of Appellees, the Plaintiffs improperly 
characterize the facts before the trial court as to the execution of the Handwritten Note, 
the 1999 Amendment and the Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment. 
The Defendant has placed before the trial court uncontroverted evidence that Betty 
initialed and/or executed all of the Modifying Documents. 
Betty executed the Handwritten Note. (R.601, 519, 496 and 498) (Brief of the 
Appellant, Exhibit 2). The Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence by affidavit or 
otherwise that Betty failed to execute the Handwritten Note. 
Betty initialed the Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment which contained the 
statement "Amended August 9, 1999." (R.229 and 235). The Plaintiffs failed to 
PAGE 4 
provide any evidence by affidavit or otherwise the Betty did not initial the Two (2) 
Pages of the 1999 Amendment. 
Betty initialed and executed by full signature the 1999 Amendment. (R.227 and 
157) (Brief of the Appellant, Exhibit 3) . The Plaintiffs contention that the 1999 
Amendment is comprised of the Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment inserted into a 
blank copy of the 1992 Trust is without support by affidavit or otherwise. In fact the 
Defendant, has shown by affidavit that the 1999 Amendment is a complete, new 
document bearing the original signature of Betty on two pages near the end of the 1999 
Amendment, each next to a notary clause of Mr. Piatt with a notary stamp expiring on 
May 28, 2001, and is not merely a photocopy of the 1992 Trust. (R.227 and 157) 
(Brief of the Appellant, Exhibit 3) . The Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment 
focused on above are included in the 1999 Amendment. Other than by implication 
from the testimony of Mr. Piatt that he did not prepare more than three (3) pages for 
delivery to Betty, the Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to refute or to give rise 
to a reasonable inference contrary to one that Betty initialed and signed the 1999 
Amendment in August of 1999. 
The parties disagree as to the method and timing of actual creation of the 
Modifying Documents by Mr. Piatt, but no genuine issues of material fact as to the 
existence of each of the Modifying Documents and the execution of each of the 
Modifying Documents by Betty. 
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Betty executed by signature and/or initialed all of the Modifying Documents, all 
of which included the date of such action. 
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the existence and 
execution of the Modifying Documents. Contrary to the position of the Plaintiff, each 
of the Modifying Documents completes a modification of the 1992 Trust such that: 
1) the Defendant was granted a contingent beneficial interest in the Trust, such that if 
she survived Betty, the Defendant would be entitled to a distribution of the entire 
corpus/principal and income of the Trust; 2) that the Defendant was to be the successor 
to Betty as trustee of the Trust; and 3) that the Plaintiffs' contingent beneficial interest 
would be superceded by Defendant's, such that they would only be entitled to a 
distribution from the Trust if the Defendant did not survive Betty. 
C. This Court may review the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and as appropriate enter a finding favorable to 
the Defendant, 
This Court may review the decision of the trial court to deny the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385 
(Utah 1968); See also, Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000); Surety 
Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000); Winters 
v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1999), cert denied 994 
P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
This Court in Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385 (Utah 1968) held 
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that this Court may review a denial of a motion for summary judgment in appropriate 
circumstance: 
"While ordinarily the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable 
because it is not a final judgment, nevertheless when there are no issues of fact to 
be determined and the only dispute involves a question of law, we think this court 
has the duty and the power when a matter is before us to direct the lower court to 
enter a judgment according to the law of the case. Here the trial court ruled 
against the appellants and gave summary judgment to the respondent. 
When a party moves for summary judgment, we think the court can give a 
judgment against him as well as for him when under the law such a ruling is 
required. See Carpineta v. Shields, 70 So.2d 573 (Fla.1954), and cases cited 
therein. While there is a division in the authorities (see 48 A.L.R.2d 1188), we 
think the better procedure is for the court to grant the appropriate relief when 
there is no unresolved issue of any material fact to be determined." 
Id. at 389. 
Once Defendant's motion for summary judgment challenged the Plaintiffs' claims 
as set forth in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs bore the burden of making a 
sufficient showing to establish the existence of the essential elements of their claims. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986), Jensen v. 
IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997), Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 
874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994), Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah App. 
1994). 
In the situation where the facts are contested by the Plaintiffs and Defendant by 
affidavit or otherwise, this court reviews the evidence presented and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Surety Underwriters 
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v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71f/P35,36, 10 P.3d 338. When the evidence 
presented by the Defendant is uncontested by the Plaintiffs, then this court may draw 
reasonable inferences from such facts even though such facts and inferences are adverse 
to the Plaintiffs' claims. Id. at P/35,36. 
The Defendant in her Brief of the Appellant, identified with specificity where the 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in response to Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burdens with respect to their claim that Betty 
was subject to undue influence by Defendant in connection with Betty's execution of the 
Modifying Documents (Brief of the Appellant, p. 32 and 33). The Plaintiffs rely solely 
on evidence concerning the actions of Mr. Kevin Reeves in aiding Betty in the process 
of modifying the 1992 Trust (Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees, p. 37 and 38). These 
facts do not support the Plaintiffs' claim as set forth in their Amended Complaint (R. 
21) that Defendant unduly influenced Betty in execution of the Modifying Documents. 
The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burdens with respect to their claim that Betty 
did not possess sufficient capacity to execute the Modifying Documents (Brief of the 
Appellant, p. 37). The Plaintiffs in their Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees refer to 
evidence presented to the trial court which is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
of capacity as set forth in by this Court In re Estate ofKesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 
1985), or by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Hilbert v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152, 1157 
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(Wyo. 1996) (Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees, p. 39 and 40) 
The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burdens with respect to their claim that Betty 
suffered from dimished capacity such that Betty failed to act as trustee of the Trust 
(Brief of the Appellant, p. 40). The Plaintiffs in their Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees 
attempt to bootstrap their dimished capacity argument as to execution of the Modifying 
Documents into a diminished capacity argument as to acting as trustee of the Trust 
(Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees, p. 39 and 40). The Plaintiffs failed to present any 
evidence of Betty's inability to act as trustee, or sufficiency to receive the Modifying 
Documents (R. 367 to 374). 
The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burdens with respect to their claim that portions 
of the 1999 Amendment are inconsistent such that the 1999 Amendment is ineffective to 
grant the Defendant a superior contingent beneficial interest to that of the Plaintiffs 
(Brief of the Appellant, p. 42). The initial determination of whether the 1999 
Amendment is ambiguous is a question of law. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1251 
(Utah 1998). The Defendant contends that the 1999 Amendment is not ambiguous and 
this Court may harmonize the entire document (Brief of the Appellant, p. 41). If this 
court finds that the 1999 Amendment is ambiguous, then the court may resort to 
determine the intent of Betty in interpreting the 1999 Amendment. The Plaintiffs bear 
the burden of supporting their claim of Betty's intent, and in opposing the evidence of 
the Defendant, as the Defendant placed before the trial court extensive evidence of 
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Betty's intent that Defendant would be entitled to a distribution of the entire 
corpus/principal and income of the Trust; 2) that the Defendant was to be the successor 
to Betty as trustee of the Trust; and 3) that the Plaintiffs' contingent beneficial interest 
would be superceded by Defendant's, such that they would only be entitled to a 
distribution from the Trust if the Defendant did not survive Betty (Brief of the 
Appellant, p.42). The Plaintiffs in their Reply [sic] Brief of the Appellees fail to 
identify any evidence opposing the evidence of intent brought forth by the Defendant. 
The Plaintiffs' failed to meet their burden to support the elements of their claims. 
In the case where the Defendant presented evidence to support her motion for summary 
judgment, and the Plaintiffs failed to put before the trial evidence controverting the 
Defendant, the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where the 
Plaintiffs did put forth some evidence, such evidence and the reasonable inference 
therefrom do not support the Plaintiffs' burden of proof and the Defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. This Court may find that the trial court erred in its denial 
of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and reverse and grant Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, and deny the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment in its review of the trial court's decision for 
correctness. 
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The trial court erred in granting the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
the basis that the language of the 1992 Trust required Betty as trustor, to completely 
revoke the Trust. The Defendant has shown that pursuant to the 1992 Trust, Betty had 
the power to effect her intended modification of the 1992 Trust by delivery of a written 
instrument to the trustee of the Trust. The Defendant presented uncontroverted 
evidence to the trial court that the Handwritten Note, the 1999 Amendment and/or the 
Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment were each executed and/or initialed by Betty 
and then delivered to Betty as the trustee. The Handwritten Note, the 1999 
Amendment and/or the Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment complied with the 
requirements of the Section 3.1 of the 1992 Trust. The Handwritten Note, the 1999 
Amendment and/or the Two (2) Pages of the 1999 Amendment effected a change in the 
contingent beneficiaries of the Trust such that the Defendant was to receive the 
principal and income of the Trust if she survived Betty, the trustor, while the Plaintiffs 
were to receive the principal and income of the Trust only if the Defendant failed to 
survive Betty. 
The denial of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by the trial court is 
reviewable by this Court As such, this Court should reverse the trial court and grant 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant presented evidence to the 
trial court that the Modifying Documents effected the modification of the Trust. The 
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to support the elements of their claims after the 
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Defendant put forth evidence controverting the claims of Plaintiffs. The Modifying 
Documents were not executed under undue influence by the Defendant, Betty had 
sufficient capacity, the Modifying Documents or other documents were delivered to 
Betty as then acting trustee under the terms of the 1992 Trust, and the 1999 
Amendment is not ambiguous by its terms. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to a 
declaratory judgment that she is solely entitled to a distribution of the entire principal 
and income of the Trust due to her survival of Betty. 
Although not argued by Defendant in this Reply Brief of the Appellant but argued 
in the Brief of the Appellant, this Court should find that the attorney-client privilege 
applied to statements made by Defendant to Joseph L. Piatt, Esquire, v/hich were 
disclosed by Joseph L. Piatt and thus not admissible before the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of July, 2001. 
{^CUidk'. 
J. Jay Buttock 
Clinton J. Bullock 
Karen Bullock Kreeck 
BULLOCK LAW FIRM 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Nancy A. Means 
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